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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4140
___________
CASWELL A. CRAWFORD,
Appellant
v.
ARCHIE B. LONGLEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-00296)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 3, 2014
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 10, 2014)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Caswell A. Crawford appeals from an order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we
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will affirm the District Court’s decision.
Crawford was arrested in Florida and charged with First Degree Murder and
Armed Robbery. While being held in state custody, he was indicted on federal charges of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. Crawford pleaded guilty to the
state charges, but before he was sentenced by the state, he was transferred to federal
custody under a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to answer the federal charges.
Crawford pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 420 months’ (35 years’) imprisonment.
The federal judgment made no mention of the state charges. Crawford was returned to
state custody and was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment on November 2, 1993,
ordered to run concurrently with the federal sentence. Crawford was later sentenced for
other state crimes, but he satisfied all of his state sentences on December 25, 2009. He
was released to federal custody on January 19, 2010, pursuant to a federal detainer.
The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) calculated Crawford’s federal sentence as
consecutive to his state sentence. Crawford requested the BOP to make a nunc pro tunc
designation of the state prison as his place of confinement for his federal sentence,
pursuant to Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990). The BOP wrote a
letter to the federal sentencing judge, asking for his non-binding opinion on the
retroactive designation. S.A. 141-42. The judge suggested that the designation would
not be appropriate, as the state and federal crimes were completely unrelated, except for
some possible overlap with a state drug conviction that did not affect the length of
Crawford’s state sentence. Id. at 144. Considering the factors prescribed by 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3621(b), the BOP determined that retroactive designation would not be appropriate,
based on Crawford’s criminal history and the statement from the federal sentencing
judge. Id. at 146-47.
After exhausting administrative remedies, Crawford filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District Court, contending that the
BOP miscalculated his sentence by refusing to calculate it to run concurrently with his
state sentence. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the petition. The District
Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied relief. Crawford timely
appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and “exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous
standard to its findings of fact.” O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005)
(per curiam). We review the BOP’s denial of a nunc pro tunc designation for abuse of
discretion, see Barden, 921 F.2d at 483, and may summarily affirm on any basis
supported by the record, Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
We agree with the District Court regarding the BOP’s calculation of Crawford’s
sentence. As the record reflects, Crawford’s time in state custody from January 1, 1992,
through December 25, 2009, was credited towards his state sentence, and therefore could
not be credited towards his federal sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (“A defendant
shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has
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spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . that has not been
credited against another sentence.”) (emphasis added).1 Furthermore, a prisoner detained
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosenquendum remains in the primary
jurisdiction of the first jurisdiction—in Crawford’s case, the state of Florida—“unless and
until the first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over the prisoner.” Rios v. Wiley, 201
F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000); BOP Program Statement 5880.28 § 3b (1999) (emphasizing
that ad prosenquendum writs do not effect a transfer to federal custody). Here, Florida
did not relinquish jurisdiction prior to the time that Crawford completed his state
sentences. Accordingly, the BOP properly did not give Crawford prior custody credit for
the period starting on January 1, 1992, and ending on December 25, 2009.2
We also agree with the District Court that the BOP did not abuse its discretion in
denying Crawford’s request for a nunc pro tunc designation. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621,
the BOP has the authority to nunc pro tunc designate the place of confinement for a
prisoner’s federal sentence. Setser v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1463,
1467–68 (2012). Accordingly, the BOP had the authority to designate the state prison as

1

While the time in the state prison could not be credited against the federal sentence, in
the appropriate case the BOP can designate the state prison as the location for a federal
inmate to serve his sentence, effectively allowing the terms to run concurrently, as
discussed below.
2

Crawford was credited with 24 days for time in state custody from December 26, 2009
through January 18, 2010, when he was officially released to begin service of his federal
sentence.
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the official facility for service of Crawford’s federal sentence, allowing his state and
federal sentences to run concurrently. Barden, 921 F.2d at 483.
We have previously held that prisoners are entitled to have their requests for nunc
pro tunc designation examined by the BOP using the factors listed in § 3621(b), but the
BOP has “wide discretion in determining whether to grant the request.” McCarthy v.
Warden, 735 F.3d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The
record reflects that the BOP did review Crawford’s request under the five factors stated in
§ 3621(b), and denied his request based on Crawford’s history and characteristics, and
the recommendation of the federal sentencing court that the sentences not run
concurrently. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at
different times run concurrently unless the court orders that the terms are to run
concurrently.”). Furthermore, Crawford’s argument that the BOP should have granted
the nunc pro tunc designation to fulfill the wishes of the state court judge that his state
sentence be concurrent to his federal sentence is meritless, as “neither the federal courts
nor the [BOP] are bound in any way by the state court’s direction that the state and
federal sentences run concurrently.” Barden, 921 F.2d at 478 n.4 (citing U.S. Const. art.
VI, cl. 2).
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Accordingly, the BOP did not abuse its discretion under § 3621(b) by denying
Crawford’s nunc pro tunc request.3

3

Appellee’s Motion to File Declaration in Response to Court’s Inquiry is granted. We
agree with Appellee that the BOP was not required by any caselaw, statute, or regulation
to inform the federal sentencing court that the state court intended its sentence to be
concurrent to the federal sentence. We are pleased to learn that the BOP has since reformatted its letters to include such information when available. Declaration of Craig
Pickles, at ¶ 6.
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